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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with regard to resources, security 
and ultimately prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of Europe’s economy relies directly 
or indirectly on it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries industries and their related activities. It is also 
shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, maritime and coastal tourism, 
aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the protection of the marine 
environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats posed by unlawful activities, 
such as drugs trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Piracy in 
international waters also constitutes a threat to Europe since it can disrupt the maritime transport chain. 
These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine resources and the environment, as well as 
significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local security. It is anticipated that these risks 
and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to keep Europe as a world leader in the global 
maritime economy, an effective integrated/interoperable, sustainable maritime surveillance system and 
situational awareness are needed. 
 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, 
smuggling, piracy and terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster and more 
difficult to detect using conventional means. Hence, it is very important to find out the feasibility of 
using SAR Satellite imagery for small boat detection. Since 2008 the EC-JRC has carried out a number 
of SAR Small Boat detection controlled experiments to assess the feasibility of using Spaceborne SAR 
for Small Boat detection. This report presents the results and conclusions of the coupled spaceborne 
SAR / Airborne SAR small boat detection campaign on coastal waters carried out by the EC-JRC in 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands on 28 February 2011. 
 
The results of this coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne SAR small boat detection experiment show the 
potential of Airborne SAR for maritime surveillance is strong, in particular for small target detection 
and that small boat detection in spaceborne SAR is possible under suitable conditions of sea state, wind 
speed and incidence angle. In fact, the experiment highlights how Airborne SAR can fill in the 
maritime surveillance gap between ship-borne/land-based surveillance assets and spaceborne SAR. For 
instance, spaceborne SAR allows small boat detection under suitable sea and wind conditions. 
However, it neither allows classification nor identification of small boats. Airborne SAR, besides 
detection also allows classification and in some cases the identification of small targets.  Hence, since 
most unlawful activities in the maritime domain, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, 
smuggling, terrorism and piracy involve small boats, the potential of Airborne SAR for maritime 
surveillance is very high. Airborne SAR can use both manned and unmanned platforms. However, 
Before Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) can be routinely used for maritime surveillance in non-
segregated airspace, a significant number of key issues related to critical UAS systems have to be 
addressed, namely command and control issues, telecommunications (e.g. change over from Line-of-
Sight (LOS) to Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) Satcom), hand over of Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
between military and civil, collision avoidance systems, cross-border issues, flight plan modifications, 
contingency procedures, legal framework and regulations, etc.. Other interesting lines of research are 
UAS formation flying issues, patterns for optimal surveillance, onboard data fusion, full autonomy and 
endurance and altitude issues.  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
JRC - Metasensing Coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne SAR Campaign - Feb. 2011 Page 2 
 
 
 
1. – Introduction 
 
1.1 – Scope 
 
This report presents the key findings of the coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne SAR Small Boat 
Detection Campaign, led by the EC-JRC and conducted jointly with Metasensing in Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands in February 2011.  
 
This study addresses the potential of Airborne Mini-SAR for maritime surveillance and the 
feasibility of using UAS carrying a Mini-SAR as a complementary technology on an operational basis. 
  
To answer this statement of work, a multinational cross-disciplinary consortium with research and 
operational expertise in maritime surveillance and Airborne SAR was assembled with organisations 
involved in: 
 
1.- research in maritime surveillance using Spaceborne SAR imagery and in the processing and 
analysis of SAR imagery, as well as coordination and management of maritime surveillance 
campaigns (European Commission-JRC). 
2.- experience with Airborne SAR campaigns (Metasensing). 
 
     
1.2 – Main Objectives 
 
The work was performed with the following main objectives: 
 
 To acquire hands-on experience with Airborne Mini-SAR technologies, in particular with its 
possible applications to maritime surveillance.  
 
 To assess the potential of Airborne SAR for maritime surveillance, including small boat 
detection, illegal immigration and drugs trafficking mitigation.  
 
 To study the feasibility of using UAS as a complementary maritime surveillance technology on 
an operational basis together with currently used technologies.  
 
 To identify the main limiting factors preventing the use of UAS and enabling factors that could 
help to facilitate the operational use of UAS for maritime surveillance.  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1.3 – Context 
 
Problem Statement – The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with 
regard to resources, security and ultimately prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of 
Europe’s economy relies directly or indirectly on it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries industries 
and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, 
maritime and coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the 
protection of the marine environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats 
posed by unlawful activities, such as drugs trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised 
crime and terrorism. Piracy in international waters also constitutes a threat to Europe since it can 
disrupt the maritime transport chain. These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine 
resources and the environment, as well as significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local 
security. It is anticipated that these risks and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to 
keep Europe as a world leader in the global maritime economy, an effective integrated/interoperable, 
sustainable maritime surveillance system and situational awareness are needed.   
 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs 
trafficking, smuggling, piracy and terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster 
and more difficult to detect using conventional means. Hence, it is very important to find out the 
feasibility of using Airborne SAR and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) on an operational basis as a 
complementary maritime surveillance technology to currently used maritime surveillance assets, such 
as spaceborne SAR, coastal radars, ship-borne radars, etc. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
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2. – Research Method 
 
In order to find out the potential and feasibility of using Airborne SAR / Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) for maritime surveillance, including small boat detection, a controlled experiment on coastal 
sea waters was designed, set up and executed. The controlled experiment is briefly described next. 
 
The controlled experiment was initially planned to comprise two steps: first, the deployment of a 
small boat near the port of Rotterdam, and second, the simultaneous acquisition of a spaceborne SAR 
image and Mini-SAR image using a UAS. Due to technical problems it was not possible to use a 
UAS. A light Cessna aircraft was used to replace the UAS. Due to bad weather conditions the Cessna 
was not authorized to takeoff to acquire data at the approximate time of the SAR satellite overpass.  
 
The experiment was divided into two experiments: 
 
1.) A first experiment which comprised the deployment of a small boat near the port of 
Rotterdam at the approximate time of a SAR satellite overpass (TerraSAR-X), and  
2.) A second experiment comprising the acquisition of Mini-SAR data over the port of Rotterdam 
using a Cessna aircraft.   
 
 
2.1 – Controlled Experiment on Coastal Waters 
 
The main objective of this controlled experiment was to find out the potential of using Airborne SAR 
and UAS for maritime surveillance along the coast. The main purpose behind it was to test the 
capabilities of Airborne SAR and UAS to detect, classify and identify targets on sea. To that end, A 
small boat was deployed near the port of Rotterdam and a spaceborne SAR image of the area 
acquired. This was followed by data acquisition over the same area using a Mini-SAR carried by 
Cessna aircraft. 
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3. – Experiment Set Up 
 
In this section we describe the experiment set up, namely the experiment site selection, the SAR 
Satellite Imagery planning and the partners involved and their roles. 
3.1 – Experiment Site Selection 
 
The site for this experiment was selected based on practical considerations about the expected outcome 
of the experiment and its feasibility, including the number of boats that could be detected, the 
authorization to fly a UAS or a light aircraft and logistics challenges. Several sites have been 
shortlisted. After a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of all possible sites and the 
inputs from the Civil Aviation Authorities it was decided to carry out the experiment in Rotterdam, 
near the port of Rotterdam.  
 
3.1.2 – Site Along the Coast in Rotterdam-Netherlands 
 
The selected area for the controlled experiment was the port of Rotterdam. Figure 1 gives an overview 
of the port of Rotterdam.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Overview of the site of the experiment, the port of Rotterdam, and the footprint of the Spaceborne SAR image. 
The footprint is indicated by the four corners of the rectangle (4 green Pins). 
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3.3 – SAR Satellite Imagery Planning 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the spaceborne SAR imagery planning. The footprints of the SAR Satellite 
images selected are shown in the google earth image of the region of Porto Corallo, Sardinia, Italy. 
 
The Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite imagery available at the time the planning was done 
comprised Radarsat2 (Spotlight and Ultrafine) and TerraSAR-X (Spotlight and Stripmap). Figure 3 
illustrates the Radarsat2 images available. Table-1 illustrates the SAR satellite images and image 
modes used in the different days of the experiment.  
 
Figure 2 – TerraSAR-X / Spotlight High Resolution frames over the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The rectangles 
in red are the footprints of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlight High Resolution SAR images available in the period between 20Feb.-
28Feb. 2011. The frames are 10km x 5km. The dates and times are given bellow in Table-1. 
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Table 1- TerraSAR-X, Spotlight SAR images available from 20Feb.-28Feb.2012. 
# Morning Satellite Pass Evening Satellite Pass 
1 Start Date: 2011-02-20T05:51:12.632 - DES 
End Date: 2011-02-20T05:51:12.632 - DES 
 
2  Start Date: 2011-02-22T17:35:16.911 - ASC 
End Date: 2011-02-22T17:35:16.911 - ASC 
3  Start Date: 2011-02-23T17:18:09.735 - ASC 
End Date: 2011-02-23T17:18:09.735 - ASC 
4 Start Date: 2011-02-25T05:59:46.806 - DES 
End Date: 2011-02-25T05:59:46.806 - DES 
 
5  Start Date: 2011-02-28T17:26:42.876 - ASC 
End Date: 2011-02-28T17:26:42.876 - ASC 
 
 
The SAR image selected for the experiment was the image of 28 Feb. 2012. 
 
 
3.4 – Review of the Spaceborne SAR Imagery modes available 
 
 
The Radarsat2 and TerraSAR-X image modes used in the present experiment will be briefly reviewed 
in the next paragraphs.  
 
Radarsat2 - Spotlight Mode – The Spotlight Beams are intended for applications which require the 
best spatial resolution available from the RADARSAT-2 SAR system. In this mode the radar operates 
with the highest sampling rate, and so the ground swath coverage is limited to keep data rate within the 
recorder limits. Unlike the other modes, Spotlight images are also of fixed size in the along track 
direction.  
 
The ser of Spotlight Beams cover any area within the incidence angle range from 20 to 49 degrees. 
Each beam within the set images a swath width of at least 18 km. Spotlight images can only be 
generated in a single polarization, which can be either a linear co-polarization (HH or VV) or a linear 
cross-polarization (HV or VH). 
 
 
Radarsat2 - Single Beam Mode – Single beam mode is a stripmap SAR mode. In Single Beam 
operation, the beam elevation and profile are maintained constant throughout the data collection 
period. The following Single Beam modes are available: Standard, Wide, Fine, Multi-Look Fine, 
Ultra-Fine, Extended High (High Incidence), Extended Low (Low Incidence), Standard Quad 
Polarization and Fine Quad Polarization. We selected Ultra-Fine because it is the best compromise 
between swath coverage and resolution. 
 
Radarsat2 - Ultra-Fine – The Ultra-Fine Resolution Beams are intended for applications which 
require very high spatial resolution. In this mode the radar operates with the highest sampling rate, and 
so the ground swath coverage is limited to keep data rate within the incidence angle from 20 to 49 
degrees. Each beam within the set images a swath width of at least 20 km. Ultra-Fine Resolution 
images can only be generated in a single cross-polarization , which can be either a linear co-
polarization (HH or VV) or a linear cross-polarization (HV or VH).  
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Figure 3 – Radarsart2 image modes. The Ultrafine and the Spotlight modes have been identified as the most suitable 
modes for this particular experiment.  
 
 
The standard TerraSAR-X operational mode is the single receive antenna mode from which the 
following imaging modes can be retrieved: High Resolution Spotlight and Spotlight, StripMap, and 
ScanSAR. The single receive antenna mode uses a chirp 
bandwidth of up to 300 MHz. 
 
Figure 4 – Radarsart2 image modes. The Ultrafine and the Spotlight modes have been identified as the most suitable 
modes for this particular experiment.  
 
The SpotLight (SL) imaging modes use phased array beam steering in azimuth direction to increase 
the illumination time, i.e. the size of the synthetic aperture. This leads to a restriction in the image / 
scene size. Thus, the scene size is technically restricted to a defined size: 10 km x 10 km for the 
SpotLight mode and 10 km x 5 km (width x length) in the HighResolution SpotLight (HS) mode. 
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This sophisticated imaging mode makes it possible to acquire data with up to 1 m resolution in the 
HighResolution SpotLight mode (acquired with a bandwidth of 300 MHz) and 2 m in the standard 
SpotLight mode. 
 
StripMap (SM) is the basic SAR imaging mode as known e.g. from ERS-1 and other radar satellites. 
The ground swath is illuminated with continuous sequence of pulses while the antenna beam is fixed in 
elevation and azimuth. This results in an image strip with a continuous image quality (in flight 
direction). StripMap dual polarisation data have a slightly lower spatial resolution and smaller swath 
than the single polarisation data. 
 
In StripMap mode, a spatial resolution of up to 3 m can be achieved. The standard scene size is 30 km 
x 50 m (width x length) in order to obtain manageable image files; however, acquisition length is 
extendable up to 1,650 km. 
 
 
The spaceborne SAR image selected was a TerraSAR-X-Spotlight acquired on 28 Feb.2011 by 
17:26:42 UTC. Table 2 gives the basic characteristics of the SAR image.  
 
 
Table 2 – Spaceborne SAR image acquired over Porto Corallo, Sardinia, Italy.  
Date/Time Area Satellite / Mode Polarization Pass 
28.Feb. 2011 (PM) 
T17:26:42.876 
Rotterdam-The 
Netherlands TerraSAR-X / Spotlight HH Ascending 
 
 
3.4 – Partners Involved and their Roles 
 
The partners involved in this experiment comprised the European Commission (EC) – Joint Research 
Centre (JRC). The role of each partner is briefly described next. 
 
3.4.1 - European Commission (EC) – Joint Research Centre (JRC)  
 
– The main role of the EC-JRC was the planning, set up, execution and the analysis of the data 
together with Metasensing. This comprised: 
 
a.) the definition of the objectives,  
b.) the research methods used,  
c.) the ground truth data collection,  
d.) the analysis of the data and the conclusions of the experiment. 
 
 
3.4.2 – Metasensing.  
 
– The main role of Metasensing comprised: 
 
a.) the deployment and operation of the boat used as target. 
b.) the deployment and operation of the Mini-SAR. 
c.) the contacts with the Dutch authorities, to obtain all required authorisations. 
d.) the collection of ground truth data. 
e.) The analysis of the data and conclusions of the experiment. 
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4. – Experiment Execution 
 
4.1 – Modus Operandi  
 
The modus operandi in this trial was as follows: 
 
1.- JRC supplied Metasensing with the footprint (frame) of the spaceborne SAR image to be acquired 
(TerraSAR-X-Spotlight), as well as the time of the SAR satellite pass. 
 
2.- A 20-meter boat was deployed near the port of Rotterdam with two mebers of staff, one from the 
EC-JRC (Victor Silva) and one from Metasensing (Adriano Meta) to collect ground truth data and 
make sure that the boat was actually deployed on the right location. 
 
3.- The boat left from the port of Scheveningen - Den Haag towards the port of Rotterdam about 2 
hours before the SAR Satellite pass. The entire GPS trajectory of the boat from the port of 
Schveningen to the port of Rotterdam and back is illustrated in figure 6, in Blue. 
 
 
 
4.2 – Ground Truth Data Collection 
 
The ground truth data collected comprised: 
 a.) the sea state. 
 b.) Data from the Airborne sensors. 
            b.) the weather conditions and wind speed. 
 e.) Photos and movies of the boat involved in the experiment. 
 f.) GPS coordinates of the trajectory of the Boat deloyed. 
 
 
4.3 – Means Involved in the Experiment 
 
The means involved in the experiment comprised a spaceborne SAR image (TerraSAR-X-Spotlight), 1 
boat (a 20-meter boat) and a Cessna carrying a Mini-SAR.  
 
 
 
4.3.1 – Boat Deployed During the Experiment 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the boat deployed as a target during the experiment. 
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Figure 5 – The 20-meter boat moored at Den Haag Scheveningen Marina before the deployment.  
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Figure 6 – GPS trajectory of the Boat deployed (Aquila) from the port of Schveningen to the port of Rotterdam and back. 
The 4 Green Pins indicate the corners of the SAR image footprint. The Pink Pin indicates the exact position of the Boat. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 – UAS / Cessna Deployed by Metasensing 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the Cessna deployed by Metasensing to replace the Rotorcraft. It also shows the 
Rotorcraft, the Mini-SAR and the two swaths of Mini-SAR data acquired during the experiment. The 
Mini-SAR is relatively light (about 20kg). It can be easily adjusted to most airborne systems, both 
manned and unmanned.  
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Figure 7– On the top left, the Unmanned Rotorcraft that was supposed to be deployed by Metasensing and was not 
deployed due to technical problems. On the top right, the Cessna deployed by Metasensing to replace the Rotorcraft The 
main payload was a high resolution Mini-SAR developed by Metasensing. On the bottom left, a photo of the Mini-SAR. 
On the bottom right, an overview of the area of the experiment at the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, including the 
two stripes of Mini-SAR data acquired..  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows a more detailed view of the area of the experiment with the two Mini-SAR swaths 
acquired during the experiment. As it can be seen the two swaths are in the footprint of the SAR 
satellite image. The acquisition of the spaceborne and airborne SAR images was supposed to be 
simultaneous, so that the Airborne images could be used as ground truth data of the spaceborne image. 
Unfortunately, due to bad weather conditions it was not possible. The Spaceborne SAR image was 
acquired on 28 Feb. 2012 and the Airborne Mini-SAR swaths were acquired the day after. 
 
Since the Mini-SAR can be easily adjusted to an unmanned airborne system, the results of the present 
experiment can be extrapolated to unmanned platforms, at least to some extent if the main differences 
between manned and unmanned platforms are carefully observed and taken into account. 
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5. – Preliminary Data Analysis 
 
5.1 – SAR Satellite Imagery Processing 
 
The high resolution spaceborne SAR image was analysed visually, since the resolution is good enough 
to allow visual analysis and the site it is too close to the coast, which makes automatic processing more 
difficult and prone to error due to artefacts caused by land targets.  
 
The Mini_SAR images were also analysed visually.  
 
 
5.2 – Ground Truth Data  
 
This section briefly describes the Ground Truth data, namely the GPS positions of the boats deployed 
as targets during the experiment, photos of the boats, as well as other relevant ground truth data 
collected, including the weather conditions.     
 
5.2.1 – GPS coordinates of the boat deployed 
 
Tables 3 gives the GPS coordinates of the boat deployed during the experiment. 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Ground Truth data collected during the experiment on 28 February 2011. 
Date: 28.Feb.2011 
Time:  17:26:42.876 UTC - / Pass: Ascending 
Satellite/Mode: TerraSAR-X / 
Spotlight 
Polarisation :  HH 
Boats Type / Size Latitude  Longitude  
20-
meter 
Rubber 
Boat 
 
51.994°N 04.083°E 
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5.2.1 – Mini-SAR Data 
 
Figure 8 shows a more detailed view of the area of the experiment with two of the Mini-SAR swaths 
acquired during the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8– Area of the experiment with two of the Mini-SAR swaths acquired during the experiment over the port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands.  
 
 
Figure 9 shows another google earth image with a third Airborne Mini-SAR swath.  more detailed 
view of the area of the experiment with two of the Mini-SAR swaths acquired during the experiment. 
 
Figure 10 shows another google earth image with a zoom in on the third Airborne Mini-SAR swath 
acquired during the experiment over the port of Rotterdam. 
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Figure 9– Area of the experiment with two of the Mini-SAR swaths acquired during the experiment over the port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands.  
 
 
 
Figure 10– Google earth image of the area of the experiment showing a zoom in on one of the Mini-SAR swaths acquired 
during the experiment over the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands.  
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5.3 – Weather Conditions and Sea State 
 
The weather conditions in Porto Corallo are summarized in Table 4 bellow.  
 
 
Table 4 – Wind speed, wind direction, Temperature and other relevant parameters. 
Time 
(IST) Temp. 
Dew 
Point Humidity Pressure Visibility 
Wind 
Dir 
Wind 
Speed 
Gust 
Speed Precip Events Conditions 
6:25 
PM 4.0 °C 3.0 °C 93% 1029 hPa 2.0 km NE 
14.8 km/h 
/ 4.1 m/s - N/A - 
Mostly 
Cloudy 
 
 
Figure 11 gives the weather data (Temperature, Barometric Pressure, Wind Speed and Wind Direction) 
for Rotterdam, The Netherlands on 28 Feb. 2011. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – Weather data (Temperature, Barometric Pressure, Wind Speed and Wind Direction) in Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands on 28 Feb. 2011.
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The sea state was very rough as illustrated by the sequence of photos taken during the mission and 
presented next in figure 12. Despite of the very rough sea state the boat was detected in the TerraSAR-
X, Spotlight image acquired during the experiment. The initial plan was to acquire Airborne Mini-SAR 
images at the approximate time of the SAR satellite overpass. Unfortunately, due to the limited 
visibility and wind speed the Cessna was not authorized to takeoff. The acquisition of Airborne Mini-
SAR data took place the day after over the port of Rotterdam. The Mini-SAR swaths acquired are 
illustrated in figures 8-10 and the visual analysis of the data will be addressed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 – Photos of the sea during the mission. As it can be seen the sea state was very rough.  
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5.4 – Verification of the Results 
 
This section briefly describes the verification of the targets detected in the spaceborne SAR image and 
in the Airborne Mini-SAR swaths over the port of Rotterdam in The Netherlands using the ground 
truth data collected during the experiment. 
 
 
5.4.1 – Targets Detected in the TerraSAR-X-Spotlight Image 
 
Figure 13 gives an overview of the area of the experiment. The 4 Green Pins are the corners of the 
spaceborne SAR image footprint. The Blue line illustrates the GPS trajectory of the boat deployed 
from the port of Schveningen in the Hague to the port of Rotterdam. The Pink Pin gives the exact GPS 
position of the boat deployed at the time of the satellite overpass.   
 
Figure 13 – Google Earth image of the area of the experiment. The 4 Green Pins indicate the footprint of the TerraSAR-X, 
Spotlight image acquired on 28Feb.2011. The line in Blue indicates the GPS trajectory of the Boat deployed from the port 
of Schveningen to the port of Rotterdam and back. The Pink Pin indicates the exact GPS position at the time of the satellite 
overpass. 
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Figure 14 is a subset of the TerraSAR-X, Spotlight High Resolution image acquired over the port of 
Rotterdam during the experiment. The Green circle indicates the SAR signature of the boat deployed 
(AQUILA). The SAR signature is relatively strong and does not show any smearing or any other 
artefacts. Given the rough sea state it would be normal to show some smearing or other artefacts. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Subset of the TerraSAR-X, Spotlight image acquired on 28Feb.2011 during the experiment over the port of 
Rotterdam in The Netherlands. The image shows several targets of different sizes. The Green circle indicates the SAR 
signature of the Boat deployed during the experiment, “AQUILA”.   
 
 
 
This experiment indicates that spaceborne SAR can successfully be used for maritime surveillance to 
detect targets of the size and characteristics of the boat deployed even with rough sea states. The 
Airborne Mini-SAR swaths will be analysed in the next section. 
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5.4.2 – Targets Detected in the Airborne Mini-SAR Swaths  
 
 
The two Airborne Mini-SAR swats acquired over the port of Rotterdam are illustrated in figure 15. 
The 4 Green Pins are the corners of the spaceborne SAR image footprint acquired the day before. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 – Area of the experiment with two Mini-SAR swaths acquired during the experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 16 illustrates two Airborne Mini-SAR swaths acquired over the port of Rotterdam. The first 
swath is the one on the top of the figure. The two images in the centre are subsets of the first swath 
zoomed in. As it can be seen these Mini-SAR images have a very high resolution. They are 
particularly suitable for the detection of small targets. The second Mini-SAR swath is on the bottom of 
figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 17 shows a zoomed in subset of one of the swaths. This zoomed in subset illustrates the very 
high resolution of the Mini-SAR and the high potential for the detection of small targets- An important 
characteristic of the Mini –SAR imagery is that it can operate in 24/7 regardless of weather conditions, 
except for strong winds or low visibility. 
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Figure 16 – On the top, a Mini-SAR swath with a large number of targets. On the centre, two subsets of the swath on the top zoomed in. As it can be seen, the Mini-SAR images 
have a very high resolution. On the bottom, a second Mini-SAR swath 
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Figure 17– Subset of one of the Mini-SAR swats zoomed in. This zoomed in subset shows the very high resolution of the image. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.4.3 – Mini-SAR Operational Limitations 
 
The use of the Mini-SAR for maritime surveillance is mainly limited by the weather conditions. The 
Mini-SAR has to be carried by an airborne platform, which can be a manned or unmanned aircraft. 
This type of airborne platforms can only fly under suitable weather conditions of wind speed and 
visibility and weather in general.  
 
5.5 – Quantitative Analysis of the Spaceborne SAR Image  
 
In order to allow a quantitative analysis of the data, the spaceborne SAR image was calibrated using 
ESA’s NEST software package, version 4B. The input was the SAR image acquired and the output 
was the Radiometric Calibration (Sigma Naught (σ°)) expressed in terms of intensity and in decibel 
(dB), the Radar Brightness (β°) and the Radiometric Normalisation (gamma naught (γ°)). 
 
5.5.1 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlight, 28Feb.2011 (17:26:42.876 UTC - / Pass: 
Ascending UTC), Rotterdam-The Netherlands. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the Intensity band of a subset of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011). 
 
 
Figure 18 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) –Amplitude band.
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Figure 19 illustrates the Sigma Naught Coefficient of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) 
expressed in terms of intensity and decibel (dB). 
 
Figure 19 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) - On the left, the Sigma Naught (σ°) (intensity) and on the 
right, the Sigma Naught (σ°) (dB).  
 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the Radar Brightness (Beta Naught (β°)), and the radiometric normalisation 
(Gamma Naught (γ°)) of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) expressed in dB. 
 
Figure 20 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) - On the left, the Beta Naught (β°) and on the right, the Gamma 
Naught (γ°) (dB).
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Figure 21 shows the Sigma Naught (σ°) in dB after some colour manipulation and the histogram of the 
Sigma Naught (σ°) image.  
 
 
Figure 21 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) - On the top left the Sigma Naught (σ°) after colour 
manipulation to enhance the targets and on the top right, the corresponding histogram. On the bottom, we can see the 
histogram of the image.  
 
 
Table 5 gives the statistics of the Sigma Naught (σ°) TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011). The 
Sigma Naught (σ°) range from -42.320 dB up to 38.475 dB. The Mean value is -16.043 dB, the 
Median is -16.914 dB and the standard deviation is 5.838 dB. 
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Table 5 – Statistics of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (28Feb.2011) (17:26 UTC) 
Statistics Values Unit 
Only ROI-Mask pixels considered:   
Number of pixels total:        
Number of considered pixels:  
Ratio of considered pixels:    
No 
53877048 
53877048 
100.0 % 
 
Minimum:      
Maximum:    
-42.32041549682617 
38.47500228881836 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
Mean:          
Median:       
Std-Dev:      
Coefficient of Variation:  
-16.043004126554912 
-16.91404388844967   
5.838443679025168   
0.5677452336744626  
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
 
 
Checking the radar backscattering coefficient of the targets (boats) detected, we get values ranging 
from 4.550 dB up to 36.052 dB. The SAR signature of the boat deployed has 6.460 dB.The analysis of 
the Sigma Naught values (σ°) of the targets and the area around the targets shows a significant 
contrast.  
 
5.6 – Summary of the Preliminary Analysis of the Spaceborne 
SAR Image and the Airborne Mini-SAR Swaths 
 
This experiment involved one spaceborne SAR image TerraSAR-X-Spotlight, several Airborne Mini-
SAR swaths and one boat. The boat deployed as target was detected in the spaceborne SAR image. 
The Airborne Mini-SAR swaths detected several boats and other small targets. Table 6 summarises the 
characteristics of the SAR image acquired and the targets detected.  
 
Table 6 –  List of spaceborne and airborne SAR Images acquired during the experiment and detected boats. 
ROTTERDAM – THE NETHERLANDS 
Date / Time Place Satellite / Mode Ground Truth Data Detected Boats 
28.Feb.2011 (PM) Rotterdam - Netherlands TerraSAR-X / Spotlight GPS/Photos/Movies 
1 out of 1 deployed 
+  
Several Targets of 
opportunity  
01.Mar.2011 Rotterdam - Netherlands Mini-SAR Swaths GPS/Photos/Movies 
Several Targets of 
opportunity 
 
Table 7 gives the minimum and maximum Sigma Naught (σ°) of the targets detected in each SAR 
image. 
 
Table 7 – Minimum and maximum Sigma Naught (σ°) of the targets detected in each SAR image. 
Date /Time UTC (LT)/Pass Satellite / Image Mode / Polarisation Sigma Naught (σ°) Min / Max
28.Feb.2011/17:26:57 UTC/ ASC TerraSAR-X / Spotlight / HH 4.550dB / 36.052 dB 
 
 
The SAR signatures of the boats deployed were very weak. Some possible reasons to explain such 
weak signatures are the sea state, the wind speed, the incidence angle and the type and materials. 
Another possible reason is the processing at DLR.    
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6. – Preliminary Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the results of this coupled UAS/Spaceborne SAR experiment shows a promising 
potential for the use of UAS for maritime surveillance. UAS can be integrated into the airborne 
building block of maritime surveillance systems to complement the existing assets, increase system 
performance and improve the overall maritime domain awareness. The main perceived maritime 
security and safety threats comprise piracy, terrorist and military threats, weapons 
proliferation/smuggling, drugs trafficking, illegal immigration, unlawful use of containers, attacks to 
critical infrastructures and illegal fishing. The main maritime security and safety gaps include a lack of 
technologies with the capability of detecting small targets (e.g. small boats), a lack of wide area and 
persistent maritime surveillance, a lack of coordination and information sharing, limited 
interoperability, a lack of containers security, a lack of persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures 
and early warning systems. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are an emerging technology with 
strong potential to mitigate the above mentioned threats by filing in the main maritime security and 
safety gaps listed earlier. For instance, the wide range of potential applications of UAS to maritime 
surveillance includes, but is not limited to: 
 
• ─ detection, classification and identification of small boats,  
• ─ persistent maritime surveillance,  
• ─ use as communications relays,  
• ─ persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures,  
• ─ early warning systems,  
• ─ COMINT and ELINT collection, etc..  
 
Table 11 illustrates the mapping of maritime security/safety threats vs gaps and summarises the main 
potential applications of UAS to maritime surveillance.  
 
The above mentioned potential applications of UAS to the Maritime Domain will be addressed in turn 
in more detail next. 
 
• ─ Detection, classification and identification of small boats – The capability of detecting, classifying 
and identifying small targets (e.g. small boats) is among the key technologies required to improve 
maritime domain awareness. This capability is critical to mitigate piracy, illegal immigration, drugs 
trafficking, weapons smuggling, illegal fishing, terrorism and critical infrastructure. Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide this capability more efficiently and at a lower cost than any other 
existing technology.     
 
• ─ Persistent maritime surveillance – With the continuous improvements of UAS technologies, such 
as platforms, sensors, collision avoidance systems, command and control systems, 
telecommunications, etc., UAS are increasing their autonomy, endurance and flexibility. These 
characteristics are very important for persistent maritime surveillance. UAS can be launched from 
land, ships, aircraft and technologies to launch UAS from submarines are currently under 
development. UAS have distinct advantages over other existing technologies for persistent maritime 
surveillance in terms of autonomy/endurance (the Global Surveyor has an autonomy of 1 week), cost 
(e.g. as the autonomy of UAS increases, the number of staff required to operate UAS decreases), risk 
(e.g. if the UAS crashes the crew is not at risk), flexibility (e.g. they can be launched from a ship 
reducing the time to reach potential threats), etc..  
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• ─ Communications relays – UAS are being used as communication relays, mainly in military 
context, but have the potential to play a similar role in Civil context in several situations, such as to 
replace satellite communications or as a redundant system over any location on Earth. The main 
advantages of using UAS as communication relays is that airborne communication relays mitigate 
kinetic and noise jamming threats to satellite communications uplinks by providing an alternative set 
of links either directly to surface-based terminals or to satellites beyond the range of threats. They are 
less susceptible to noise jamming threats than satellites because an adversary has to detect, geolocate 
and track the airborne asset and operate within line of sight of the receive antenna main beam.  
 
• ─ Persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures – The security of critical infrastructures, such as 
nuclear power plants, refineries, ports, etc. requires persistent surveillance. UAS can play an important 
role in providing persistent surveillance over critical infrastructures and over a wide area around the 
critical infrastructure. Some advantages of UAS over other existing technologies, such as ground-
based assets (e.g. video cameras, alarm systems, manned aircraft, etc.), comprise the security of the 
UAS (e.g. hardly can be damaged or switched off as any ground-based asset), the area covered by a 
UAS (e.g. it is larger than the area covered by any ground-based asset), the cost (e.g. UAS is cheaper 
than manned aircraft with similar capability), etc..    
 
• ─ Early warning systems – UAS have the potential to be used as part of an integrated system of 
systems for early warning. A UAS can provide information about a given area at a fraction of the cost 
of alternative means. Formation flying of UAS can cover a wide maritime area. It is reasonable to 
assume that in a foreseeable future with the advent of UAS with increased autonomy, the operations 
cost of UAS will likely decrease, making them increasingly more attractive. 
 
• ─ COMINT and ELINT collection – SIGNal INTelligence (SIGNINT) can be divided into two 
categories, namely COMINT and ELINT. COMINT stands for Communication Intelligence and 
ELINT for Electronic Intelligence. Collection of COMINT is passive. Exploitation of COMINT 
requires a human operator, which implies COMINT UAS are suitable for COMINT and ELINT 
collection in different scenarios,   
 
The relatively reduced amount of data collected and analysed during this experiment and the lessons 
learned do not allow drawing final conclusions about the feasibility of using Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS) for maritime surveillance. However, this experiment allowed hands-on experience 
with UAS technologies and significantly improved the awareness for its applications to maritime 
surveillance and related issues involved, including its potential, the feasibility, as well as the limiting 
and enabling factors. These different aspects will now be analysed in turn in the next sections.   
 
Table 11 illustrates the mapping of the main maritime security threats and gaps, as well as the main 
priorities in terms of the different technologies involved in maritime surveillance. For each maritime 
threat, the technologies required to fill in each gap is indicated and its priority is expressed in a range 
of numbers (1 to 3, 1 = Maximum Priority, 2 = Medium Priority, 3 = Low Priority) and colours (Red = 
Maximum Priority, Orange = Medium Priority, Green = Low Priority). The main technologies 
involved in maritime surveillance are listed on the bottom of figure 4 and are reproduced here for 
convenience of the reader: 1.- Reporting Systems, 2.- Sensors, 3.- Platforms, 4.- Communications, 5.- 
Data Fusion & Sharing, 6.- Intelligence and 7.- Databases. For example, the mitigation of the main 
threat Piracy requires filling in several maritime security gaps (e.g. lack of persistent surveillance, lack 
of wide-are maritime surveillance, lack of small boat detection, lack of Early Warning Systems, and 
lack of Information Sharing with maximum priority (1- Red) and among the required technologies 
listed are UAS, LTAAV, GEO-HR, etc. Concerning the remaining two gaps (Limited Interoperability 
and Containers Security) they are less relevant to mitigate Piracy, hence the priority for Limited 
Interoperability is 2-Orange and for Containers Security is 3- Green. 
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Table 8 – The Main Maritime Security and Safety Threats vs Gaps and the technologies that can be used to mitigate them. 
Maritime Security Main Threats / Gaps
Gaps→
↓Threats
Lack  o f Risk 
As sessment
Capab ility
La ck of 
Persiste nt 
Surveilla nce
La ck of Wid e-
Area su rve illanc e
La ck of  Small 
Boat  De tecti on
Lack o f Earl y 
Warn ing  
Sys tems
L ack of  
In forma tion
Sh arin g
L imi ted 
In terop era bility
Lac k of 
Co ntai ners
Se cur ity
• Piracy
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, GEO-HR
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
UAS, LTAV, 
+ ...
Coord in ation
& Sharing  + ...
Inter opera bility
Optimisation  + ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Terro rism
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS,  L TAV, 
GEO-HR + ...
SAR, AIS
GEO-HR + ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Inter opera bility
Optimisation  + ...
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Wea pon s of
M ass Dest ru ctio n 
Smugg ling
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Drug s
Traffic king
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Illega l
Immigratio n
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Critic al
I nfrastruc ture
Secu rit y
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ... + ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2,  3, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Illega l
Fish ing
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
AI S+SAR, 
UAS,LTAV + ...
SAR, AIS, GEO-
HR+ .. .
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Un lawf ul Use of  
Co nta iners
(Secur ity)
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
GPS Tr acking
+ .. .
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
GPS, Int rusion 
Det ection, Se al 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 4, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
(-) Priority (+) Not Rel evant
SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGIES
1.- Reporti ng  
Systems 
2. -Sensors 3. -P latforms 4. - Communications 5.- Data Fusion
& Sharing
6. -I ntelli gence 7. -Databases
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6.1 – Hands-on experience with UAS technologies and its 
applications to maritime surveillance 
 
This coupled Airborne Mini-SAR / Spaceborne SAR campaign was a unique opportunity to acquire 
hands–on experience with Airborne SAR technologies and learn about the main issues related to its 
applications to maritime surveillance. From the planning phase up to the execution of the Mini-SAR 
flight there are several factors that need to be carefully analysed and taken into account. A summary of 
the main issues identified in this experiment is given next. 
  
1.- Selection of the Experiment Area /Authorisation to Fly – This experiment was initially planned 
to use a UAS. Due to technical problems the UAS was replaced by a light aircraft (Cessna). However, 
the small aircraft has many similarities with the UAS. Apart the permission to fly, which is far more 
difficult for UAS, the operational side of maritime surveillance has many similarities. The Mini-SAR 
used in this experiment is very light (about 20Kg), so it can be easily carried by UAS as part of its 
payload. For the time being UAS can only be flown in restricted areas usually under control of national 
authorities, often the military. This is due to the risks that a UAS can pose to human life and property.  
 
2.- UAS Communications Issues – Most UAS are not equipped with a Satcom antenna. Hence, most 
UAS can only fly in Line-Of-Sight (LOS) operation. To be able to fly Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) 
Satellite communications are needed.  
 
3.- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) – A SAR sensor is essential for maritime surveillance since it 
allows day and night (24 / 7) operations regardless of weather conditions. The main limiting factor that 
can prevent the UAS from flying is the wind speed.  
 
4.- Automatic Identification System (AIS) Receiver – An AIS receiver is a very important 
technology for maritime surveillance. Most UAS in use are not equipped with an AIS receiver. For 
maritime surveillance operations an AIS receiver is a very important tool since it allows the automatic 
identification of most ships allowing the UAS to concentrate on non-identified ships.  
 
 
 
6.2 – Potential of UAS for Maritime Surveillance 
 
UAS technologies are relatively recent and involve a wide range of fields spanning from aeronautics 
and sensors technologies to satellite communications and other engineering disciplines. Innovations in 
each of the fields involved are emerging by the day. UAS still have a long way to go before they 
become mature and their use fully operational. For the time being UAS are mainly used for military 
applications. However, a large number of non-military UAS applications have been identified by 
stakeholders and there are several studies and demonstration flights foreseen for the near future.    
 
Maritime surveillance is one of the most challenging and promising fields of application of UAS. The 
challenges are due to the very demanding conditions under which the UAS must operate over sea and 
the requirements for safe operation. 
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The present UAS experiment has unveiled some of the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance. 
The UAS tests performed during this experiment include: 
 
1 – Detection of a Small rubber Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
2 – Tracking of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
3 – Classification of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
4 – Identification of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
5 – Detection and Tracking of People on the Beach, 
 
Despite the operational requirement that prevented the UAS from flying bellow 3km, the experiment 
has confirmed the capability of UAS for small boat detection, tracking and classification, as well as the 
capability for people detection and tracking. Concerning the identification of the targets, the 
characteristics of the images acquired during this mission suggest that flying at lower altitudes the 
UAS images would allow the identification of the targets. The UAS images can be seen from Figure 
15 to 20. 
 
 
 
6.2.1 – Advantages of UAS for maritime Surveillance 
 
Some of the advantages of using UAS for maritime surveillance have been described in the literature 
and are summarized bellow.  
 
● 1.- One potential benefit of UAS is that they could fill in a gap in current maritime 
surveillance by improving coverage. 
● 2.- The range of UAS is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or 
stationary surveillance equipment. 
● 3.- Eletro-Optical InfraRed (EOIR) sensors (cameras) can identify small size objects from 
very high altitudes (high resolution). 
● 4.- UAS can provide precise and near-real-time imagery to a ground control operator, who 
would then disseminate that information so that informed decisions regarding the 
deployment of border patrol agents can be made quickly. 
● 5.- Long endurance UAS used along the border can fly for more than 30 hours up to 
several days without having to refuel, compared with manned helicopter’s average 
flight time of just over 2 hours. 
● 6.- The ability of UAS to loiter for prolonged periods of time has important operational 
advantages over manned aircraft. 
● 7.- The longer flight times of UAS means that sustained coverage over a previously 
exposed area may improve maritime security. 
● 8.- The range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or 
stationary surveillance equipment. Nevertheless, the extended range and endurance of 
UAVs may lessen the burdens on human resources at the borders. 
● 9.- UAS accidents do not risk the lives of pilots, as do the helicopters and aircraft currently used by 
Coast Guards for border patrolling. 
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6.2.2 – Possible Drawbacks of using UAS for maritime Surveillance 
 
UAS also have disadvantages; some of them are briefly described next. 
 
● 1.- There have been concerns regarding the high accident rate of UAS, which can be multiple times 
higher than that of manned aircraft. Because UAS technology is still evolving, there is less 
redundancy built into the operating system of UAS than of manned aircraft and until redundant 
systems are perfected mishap rates are expected to remain high.  
 
● 2.- If control systems fail in a manned aircraft, a well-trained pilot is better positioned to find the 
source of the problem because of his/her physical proximity. If a UAS encountered a similar system 
failure, or if a UAS landing was attempted during difficult weather conditions, the ground control 
pilot would be at a disadvantage because he or she is removed from the event. Unlike a manned pilot, 
the remote pilot would not be able to assess important sensory information such as wind speed. 
 
● 3.- Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAS surveillance capability, especially 
UAS equipped with only an EO camera and Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), because cloudy 
conditions and high humidity climates can distort the imagery produced by EO and FLIR equipment. 
The effects of extreme climatic or atmospheric conditions on sensors reportedly can be mitigated with 
the outfit of one synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system and a moving target indicator (MTI) radar. 
However, adding SAR and MTI to a UAS platform would increase the costs associated with using 
UAS. 
 
● 4.- Depending on the type of UAS, the costs of operating a UAS can be higher than the costs of 
operating a manned aircraft. This is because some types of UAS require a significant amount of 
logistical support and specialized operator and maintenance training. Operating one UAS may require 
a crew of up to 20 support personnel. The high comparative costs of operating some sophisticated 
types of UAS may be offset somewhat by their comparatively lower unit costs.  
 
6.3 – Main Limiting Factors Preventing the Use of UAS 
 
Several pre-requisites must be satisfied to render the UAS a viable, cost-effective and regulated 
alternative to existing resources. Major civil and commercial market barriers include: 
 
● ─ Single European Sky 
● ─ Sense and Avoid technologies 
● ─ Command and Control Technologies Reliability 
● ─ Communications (Bandwidth, LOS, BLOS)  
 ● ─ Lack of airspace regulation that covers all types of UAV systems (encompassing ‘sense and avoid’, 
airspace integration and airworthiness issues) 
 ● ─ Affordability - price and customization issues (e.g. commercial off-the-shelf, open modular architecture) 
● ─ Lack of efforts to establish joint customer requirements (although this is gradually changing)  
● ─ Liability for civil operation  
● ─ Capacity for payload flexibility  
● ─ Lack of sufficient secure non-military frequencies for civil operation  
● ─ Perceived reliability (e.g. vehicle attrition rate vs. manned aircraft)  
● ─ Operator training issues  
● ─ Recognition/customer perception of the UAV market  
● ─ Technology developments for multi-mission capability  
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6.4 – UAS Key Enabling Technologies 
 
Figure 22 illustrates the components of a typical UAV System, showing some of the capabilities 
needed and the enabling technologies required for performing a given mission. Any UAV mission 
involves many capabilities and technologies. Due to the depicted system complexity the main key 
players, such as the US Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies have started to use the term 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) in place of UAV. 
 
 
Figure 22 – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System. Enabled by: Autonomous Mission Management, Reliable Flight Systems, 
Navigation Accurate Systems, Terrain Avoidance, Power and Propulsion 
 
 
Some UAS key enabling technologies are listed below.   
 
   ● ─ Autonomous Mission Management  
   ● ─ Collision Avoidance  
   ● ─ Intelligent System Health Monitoring  
    ● ─ Reliable Flight Systems  
   ● ─ Sophisticated Contingency Management  
   ● ─ Intelligent Data Handling and Processing  
   ● ─ Over-the-Horizon Communication  
   ● ─ Network-Centric Communication  
   ● ─ Open Architecture  
   ● ─ Power and Propulsion  
   ● ─ Navigation Accurate System Technology  
   ● ─ Enhanced Structures  
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Table 9 gives a more detailed description of other critical technologies for emerging autonomous UAV 
systems both civil and military. Most of the technologies mentioned in Table 12 apply both to civil and 
military UAV systems. 
 
 
Table 9 – Key Enabling Technologies (from SG/75 study on autonomous systems). 
Critical Technologies 
Decision Making Software: 
• Fuzzy-based decision making 
• Knowledge-based system 
• Case-based reasoning 
• Self-learning techniques 
• Decision tree evaluation 
• Reasoning/Inferring 
• Probabilistic/stochastic reasoning 
Prediction Algorithms: 
• Predictive path/intent algorithms 
• Short reaction algorithm 
• Effectiveness evaluation 
Status Assessment Software: 
• Internal status analysis 
• Self-orientation 
Situation Analysis Software: 
• Situation analysis 
• Environmental analysis 
• External status analysis 
Modelling Software: 
• Air vehicle modelling algorithms 
• Sensor modelling algorithms 
• Scenario generation 
• Threat system modeling 
• Attack simulation 
• Mission success optimisation model 
• Simulation 
Sensor Processing Software: 
• Sensor fusion 
• Area of interest identification 
• Automatic target recognition 
Adaptive and Self-learning Systems: 
• Failure self-compensation 
Attack Planning Software: 
• Attack plans and tactical alternatives 
• Plan change impact identification 
Weapon Engagement Procedure Software: 
• Weapon engagement algorithms 
Mission Plan Update Software: 
• Route planning system 
• Payload plan management system 
• Mission Success Optimisation model 
Path Optimisation Software: 
• Optimal trajectory planning 
• Path Optimisation System 
Targeting Software: 
• Target tracking 
• Target prioritisation 
Platform Technologies: 
• Obstacle detection and avoidance (airborne) 
• Obstacle detection and avoidance (ground) 
• Improved autopilot 
• Speech recognition 
 
 
 
Figure 24 summarises system element designs needed to transition from current to next-generation 
autonomous UAV systems for civilian and military UAS. 
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Figure 23 – System Element Designs Needed to Transition from Current to Next-Generation Autonomous UAV Systems. 
 
 
These new paradigms are a combination of system attributes and technological capabilities. For 
instance, the data fusion, secure anti-jam, and coordinated multi-vehicle control require technological 
development as well as specific system development to bring full maturity to unmanned systems. 
 
Finally, very small Micro UAVs (MAVs) and relatively large, sophisticated UCAV systems are 
examples of the range of UAVs that are applying the new platforms, payloads, onboard processing, 
communications, etc. to create next generation automated UAVs. It is with these new platforms, 
payloads, etc. that both UCAVs and MAV will be able to address similar operational challenges 
including: 
 
   ● ─ Mixed operation with other assets: 
    • Deconfliction, collision avoidance, C4I integration. 
   ● ─ Operation over populated areas: 
    • Safety issues. 
   ● ─ Need to reduce reliance on communications: 
    • UCAV – countermeasures. 
    • MAV – limited size and power. 
    • Limited line of sight environment. 
   ● ─ Need a fully integrated system: 
    • MAV propulsion/power generation still critical. 
    • Operator machine interface critical. 
    • All weather operations. 
    • Survivability. 
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6.5 – Mission Readiness 
6.5.1 – Mission Readiness Summary 
 
This section summarises civil UAV mission readiness. The purpose of Mission Readiness is to assess 
the readiness status of the different technologies involved in UAS. In the present case this civil UAV 
mission readiness based on technology maturation forecasts that meet or exceed the desired, or 
required, capabilities identified by the user community.  
 
Figure 25 summarises the mission readiness time forecasts for the different technologies. The 
technologies annotated with an asterisk (*) are shown within the figure with maturation forecasts based 
on development targets expressed in the US Department of Defences’ UAV Roadmap document.  
 
The purpose of the chart is to be able to identify when the capability to fly a particular mission can be 
expected as a function of time. The left-most end is the least probable and the right end the most 
probable timeframe.  
 
 
Figure 24 - Technology Maturation Summaries in Terms of Mission-Derived Capabilities.
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6.6 – Small Boat Detection in SAR Satellite Imagery 
 
The use of spaceborne SAR imagery for small boat detection requires additional small boat detection 
experiments under different conditions using different methods. It is not possible to draw final 
conclusions based on a limited number of small boat detection experiments, which are not 
representative of the multiple possible scenarios. 
 
 
 
6.7 – Limitations of current State-of-the-Art SAR Satellite 
technology 
 
The main limitations of current State-of-the-Art spaceborne SAR imagery for maritime surveillance, in 
particular aimed at small boat detection, are: 
 
1. - SAR satellites repeat cycles do not allow the coverage of the same area at the required time 
intervals. Constellations of SAR satellites could be a solution. 
 
2. - The conflict between resolution and image swath. High resolution is required to detect small boats. 
However, the high resolution images have small swaths. Maritime surveillance with high resolution 
images would require a large number of images to cover wide maritime areas, which is very expensive 
and for the time being technically not feasible. Intelligence data can play an important role by 
indicating an approximate position of suspicious non cooperative targets, therefore reducing the 
surveillance area, which can then be imaged using high resolution images. 
 
3.- Spaceborne high resolution SAR imagery acquisition times are long enough to allow significant 
motion of the target during the acquisition time degrading the quality of the image. Further research 
efforts are needed to develop new sensors and platforms. As far as sensors are concerned, shorter 
integration times are needed to prevent the blurring effect caused by the motion of the targets. 
Regarding the platforms, more platforms are needed to allow lower repeat cycles and improved 
coverage.
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7. – Plans for Future Work 
 
The maritime surveillance controlled experiments carried out by the EC-JRC together with third 
parties (e.g. Member States, EU Agencies, Industry, etc.), include: 
 
1.- A Small Boat detection controlled experiment in Sardinia, Italy with Frontex and the Italian 
Authorities (Sep.  2009); 
2.- A Small Boat detection controlled campaign in Palomares Canyon, Spain with Frontex and the 
Spanish Authorities (Oct.2009); 
3.- A Small Boat detection controlled trial in the Algarve, Portugal (Dec.2009). 
4.- A Small Boat detection controlled campaign in Portoroz, Slovenia with the University of 
Slovenia (May./Jun. 2010). 
5.- A Coupled Spaceborne SAR/UAS Small Boat detection experiment in Sardinia with Alenia 
Aeronautica (Oct.2010).  
6.- A Coupled  Spaceborne SAR/UAS Small Boat detection experiment in Haifa, Israel with Elbit 
Systems (Dec.2010).  
7.- A Spaceborne SAR Small Boat detection controlled campaign in the South of Spain and in 
Portugal (Dec.2010).  
8.- A Coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne Mini-SAR Small Boat detection controlled experiment 
in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, with Metasensing (May./Jun. 2011). 
9.- A Maritime Surveillance UAS controlled experiment within the WIMAAS framework in 
Huelva, Spain, (Jul.2011). 
  
These maritime surveillance controlled experiments allowed a significant hands-on experience with 
key maritime surveillance technologies, including spaceborne SAR and UAS. The EC-JRC built an 
important knowledge about the Concepts of Use (CONUSE) and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) 
of spaceborne SAR and UAS technologies, as well as the main issues related to their use for maritime 
surveillance. Spaceborne SAR and UAS are complementary technologies for maritime surveillance 
since UAS can fill in existing maritime surveillance gaps between ground-based/ship-borne assets and 
spaceborne SAR, such as the detection, classification and identification of small targets (e.g. small 
boats). Under suitable conditions of sea state and wind speed, spaceborne SAR can be used to detect 
small boats. However, the classification and identification of small boats can not be done using 
spaceborne SAR. UAS has a strong potential to fill in that maritime surveillance gap because it allows 
classification and identification of small boats. 
 
The small boat detection trials carried out by the JRC were very successful since most small boats 
deployed during the experiments were detected in different sea states, wind speeds and geographical 
locations. The several small boat detection campaigns conducted by the EC-JRC seem to suggest that 
the probability of detection of small boats in spaceborne SAR images strongly depends on factors, 
such as the sea state, the wind speed, the type of boat (shape and materials), the weather conditions, 
etc.. The results of the experiments conducted thus far are no enough to draw final conclusions about 
the feasibility of using spaceborne SAR imagery for small boat detection. However, the experiments 
have an overall positive outcome because they indicate that under suitable sea state and wind speed 
conditions it is possible to detect small boats using spaceborne SAR. The estimation of the probability 
of detection of small boats in spaceborne SAR images requires a large number of experiments under 
different circumstances (e.g. sea state, wind speed, characteristics of the targets, image type and mode, 
etc.). 
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Future plans include additional Coupled spaceborne SAR / UAS experiments to further assess the 
potential of these technologies for maritime surveillance.  
 
Acknowledgements  
– The authors would like to express their gratitude to Metasensing for their cooperation, logistical 
support and assets deployed without which the present coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne SAR 
Small Boat Detection Campaign would have not been possible.  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
JRC - Metasensing Coupled Spaceborne SAR / Airborne SAR Campaign - Feb. 2011 Page 41 
 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Metasensing: “Metasensing Proposal for a Mini-SAR flight to collect Ground Truth data during a 
Maritime Surveillance Campaign and demonstrate Airborne SAR capabilities for Maritime 
Surveillance.”, 2010. 
[2] – Cheryl Yuhas, Suborbital Science Program Manager NASA Science Mission Directorate, “Earth 
Observations and the Role of UAVs: A Capabilities Assessment, Version 1.1”, Civil UAV 
Assessment Team, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/civuav/index.html, August 2006.  
[3] – Document NIAG (SG/75) NATO Industrial Advisory Group, Study Group 75 Pre-Feasibility Study on 
UAV Autonomous Operations, 2004. 
[4] – United States Department of Defence (DoD) Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System” and 
DoD Instruction 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System”. 
[5] – Mr. James Ramage ; Mr. Massimo Avalle ; Dr. Erik Berglund ; Dr. Luigi Crovella ; Mr. Robert 
Frampton ; Dr. Uwe Krogmann ; Mr. Christian Ravat ; Mr. Mike Robinson ; Dr. Axel Schulte ; Dr. 
Scott Wood, “RTO-TR-SCI-118 - Automation Technologies and Application Considerations for Highly 
Integrated Mission Systems”, RTO-TR-SCI-118 AC/323(SCI-118)TP/204, January 2009. 
[6] Victor M.G. Silva, Gilles Jurquet, Gabriel Marchalot, Maria T.G. Calzado, Txema Soroa, Juan Sancho, 
Adam Koubek, Harm Greidanus and Claudio Savarino, “Wide Maritime Area Airborne Surveillance 
(WIMA2S) WP5 Final Report”, WIMAAS WP5, FP7 Project, 2008-2011, - ISBN-978-92-79-22801-8 
(print), 978-92-79-22802-5 (PDF), ISSN-1018-5593 (print), 1831-9424 (online), EC-JRC Scientific 
Report, JRC 70093, 2012. 
[7] Victor M.G. Silva and Harm Greidanus, “Spaceborne SAR Small Boat Detection Campaign in 
Portugal and Spain”, EUR 25281 EN, ISBN 978-92-79-22553-6, ISSN 1831-9424 (online), EC-
JRC Scientific Report, JRC68160, 2012. 
[8] Goncalves Da Silva V, Van Wimersma Greidanus H, Hejmanowska B, Loudjani P.: “UAS 
Applications With Societal Benefits – JRC’s UAS-Related Activities”, 2011-2012 UAS Yearbook 
- UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems - The Global Perspective 9 (9); 2011. p. 127-129.  JRC66600 
[9] Goncalves Da Silva V, Van Wimersma Greidanus H.: “Small boat detection using TerraSAR-X 
and Radarsat2 satellite imagery.”, 4th TerraSAR-X Science Team Meeting; 14 February 2011; 
DLR Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany); German Aerospace Center (DLR) (Organiser). 2011.  
JRC63663 
[10] V. Silva, Harm Greidanus: “JRC - SAR Satellite Small Boat Detection Campaign - Portoroz – 
Slovenia” - ISBN-13: 978-92-79-21476-9, ISSN (online): 1831-9424, EC-JRC Scientific Report, 
JRC66835, 2011. 
[11] V. Silva, Harm Greidanus: “JRC - SAR satellite small boat detection campaign - Algarve, 
Portugal” - ISBN-13: 978-92-79-21265-9, ISSN (online): 1831-9424, ISSN (print): 1018-5593, 
EC-JRC Scientific Report, JRC66631, 2011. 
[12] – Goncalves Da Silva V., Van Wimersma Greidanus H.: “JRC-Frontex Spaceborne SAR Small 
Boat Detection Campaign – Italy & Spain”, - ISBN-13: 978-92-79-22213-9, ISSN (online): 1831-
9424, EC-JRC Scientific Report, JRC67517, 2011. 
[13] - P.W. Vachon, S.J. Thomas, J. Cranton, H.R. Edel, and M.D. Henschel. Validation of ship 
detection by the RADARSAT synthetic aperture radar and the Ocean Monitoring Workstation. 
Canadian Journal of Remote Sensing, 26(3):200–212, 2000. 
[14] - Crisp, D. (2004): The state-of-the-art in ship detection in Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery, 
DSTO Information Sciences Laboratory, Australia. 
[15] - Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Community — IMPAST and DECLIMS web site, 
http://intelligence.jrc.cec.eu.int/marine/fish/index.htm. 
[16] - McCandless, S.W., Jackson, C.R. (2004): Principles of Synthetic Aperture Radar. Synthetic 
Aperture Radar, Marine User's Manual, NOAA, Washington, pp 1-23. 
[17] - Greidanus, H. (2008): Satellite Imaging for Maritime Surveillance of the European Seas. 
Remote Sensing of the European Seas. 343-358. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
EUR 25347 EN -- Joint Research Centre -- Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
 
Title: JRC - Metasensing Coupled Spaceborne & Airborne SAR Campaign in Rotterdam 
 
Authors: Victor M.G. Silva, Harm Greidanus 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
 
2012 -- v+41 pp. -- 21.0 x 29.7 cm 
 
EUR -- Scientific and Technical Research series -- ISSN 1831-9424 (online), ISSN 1018-5593 (print) 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-25027-9 
 
doi:10.2788/28991 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with regard to resources, security and ultimately 
prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of Europe’s economy relies directly or indirectly on it. It is not just the 
shipping or fisheries industries and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore 
energy, maritime and coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the protection of the 
marine environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats posed by unlawful activities, such as drugs 
trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Piracy in international waters also constitutes a threat 
to Europe since it can disrupt the maritime transport chain. These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine resources 
and the environment, as well as significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local security. It is anticipated that these 
risks and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to keep Europe as a world leader in the global maritime economy, 
an effective integrated/interoperable, sustainable maritime surveillance system and situational awareness are needed. 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, smuggling, piracy and 
terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster and more difficult to detect using conventional means. 
Hence, it is very important to find out the feasibility of using new sensors and platforms, such as SAR or Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS) for small boat detection, tracking, classification and identification, as well as to study the potential of airborne 
SAR for maritime surveillance. Since 2010 the EC-JRC has carried out a number of coupled UAS and spaceborne SAR maritime 
surveillance campaigns to assess the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance, in particular for small boat detection. This 
report presents the results and conclusions of the JRC -- Metasensing Coupled Spaceborne SAR and Airborne SAR campaign 
carried out in Feb. 2011 in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
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